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In this paper I empirically investigate the determinants of migration inﬂows into
fourteen OECD countries by country of origin, between 1980 and 1995. I analyze the
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countries. I also examine the impact of geographical, cultural, and demographic factors
as well as the role played by changes in destination countries’ migration policies. My
analysis both delivers estimates consistent with the predictions of the international
migration model and generates empirical puzzles.
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11 Introduction
International migration patterns vary considerably over time, and across destination and
origin countries. Some OECD countries have experienced a decrease in the size of the annual
immigrant inﬂow between 1980 and 1995.1 Over the same years, the number of immigrants
per year has increased in several other OECD countries.2 The percentage change of the
annual immigrant inﬂow from 1980 to 1995 ranges between negative 42% (in Japan) and
positive 48% (in Canada) (OECD 1997). For all destinations, such changes are anything but
m o n o t o n i c( s e eF i g u r e1 ) . T h ev a r i a t i o ni nt e rms of origin countries is remarkable as well
(see Appendix 1).
Several factors are likely to inﬂuence the size, origin, and destination of labor movements
at each point in time and contribute to the variation observed in the data. However, very
few empirical works in the literature have tried to understand what drives international
migration, perhaps due to past unavailability of cross-country data.
In turn, international migration has recently received a great deal of attention in light
of research showing its beneﬁcial eﬀects from an economic-development point of view. For
example, the recent literature has pointed out repeatedly the potential of free migration
to produce large beneﬁts — most likely greater than the gains from liberalizing existing
trade barriers.3 Other studies have uncovered the role played by foreign remittances of
international migrants in their origin countries’ economies.4 To fully understand these and
other eﬀects, it is important to identify the forces and constraints that shape international
migration movements.
In this paper, I empirically investigate the determinants — economic, geographic, cultural
and demographic — of bilateral immigration ﬂows. My analysis is based on the predictions
of a simple theoretical framework that focuses on both supply and demand factors. I use
yearly data on immigrant inﬂows into fourteen OECD countries by country of origin, between
1980 and 1995. The source of this data is the International Migration Statistics for OECD
countries (OECD 1997), based on the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on Migration
(SOPEMI).
My paper is related to a vast literature on the determinants of migration which includes
works dating back to the nineteenth century (Ravenstein 1885). More recently, Clark, Hat-
ton and Williamson (2002) and Karemera, Oguledo and Davis (2000) both focus on the
fundamentals explaining immigrant inﬂows into the United States by country of origin in
the last decades. Other papers in the literature that analyze the determinants of migra-
tion to the U.S. are Borjas (1987), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and Yang (1995). Hatton
(2005) investigates trends in UK net migration in the last decades. Finally, Helliwell (1997,
1998) sheds light on factors aﬀecting labor movements in his investigation of the magnitude
of immigration border eﬀects, using data on Canadian interprovincial, US interstate and
US-Canada cross-border immigration.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, my analysis puts greater
1For example, France, Japan, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (OECD 1997).
2For example, in Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States
(OECD 1997).
3See Rodrik 2002, Pritchett 2003, Martin 2004.
4See, for example, Hanson and Woodruﬀ 2004.
2emphasis than previous works on the demand side of international migration, namely destina-
tion countries’ migration policies. This change of perspective is important, given restrictive
immigration policies in the vast majority of host countries. Second, my work is the ﬁrst one I
am aware of to use the OECD (1997) data on international migration to systematically inves-
tigate the drivers of international ﬂows of migrants. Previous works have either used country
cross-sections (Borjas 1987, Yang 1995), or have focused on a single destination country over
time (Borjas and Bratsberg 1996, Clark, Hatton and Williamson 2002, Karemera, Oguledo
and Davis 2000, Brücker, Siliverstovs, and Trübswetter 2003) or a single origin country over
time (Yang 2003).5 By extending the focus of the analysis to a multitude of origin and des-
tination countries and taking advantage of both the time-series and cross-country variation
in the data, I can test the robustness and broader validity of the results found in earlier
works.6 Third, this paper carefully reviews and proposes solutions to various econometric
issues that arise in the estimation, such as endogeneity and reverse causality. These econo-
metric complications have not all been addressed in the previous literature.7 Once I deal
with them (for example, by controlling for destination and origin countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects), my
analysis both delivers estimates broadly consistent with the predictions of the international
migration model and generates empirical puzzles.
According to the international migration model, pull and push factors have either similar-
sized eﬀects (with opposite signs), when migration quotas are not binding, or they both have
no (or a small) eﬀect on emigration rates, when migration quotas are binding. It is not clear,
ex ante, which one of the two scenarios characterizes actual ﬂows. Migration policies in
the majority of destination countries are very restrictive, which should imply binding con-
straints on the number of migrants. On the other hand, even countries with binding oﬃcial
immigration quotas often accept unwanted (legal) immigration.8 Restrictive immigration
policies are often characterized by loopholes, that leave room for potential migrants to take
advantage of economic incentives. For example, immigration to Western European countries
still took place after the late Seventies, despite the oﬃcial closed-door policy (Joppke 1998).
Family-reuniﬁcation and asylum-seekers policies can explain continuing migration inﬂows to
Western Europe.9
My empirical results are puzzling because they are in part consistent with the ﬁrst sce-
nario and in part with the second one. I ﬁnd that pull factors - that is, improvements in
the mean income opportunities in the destination country - signiﬁcantly increase the size of
emigration rates. This result is very robust to changes in the speciﬁcation of the empirical
model. Both absolute and relative pull factors matter. That is, the emigration rate to a
given destination is an increasing function of that country’s per worker GDP and a decreas-
5The paper most related to mine is Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2002).
6Since I began working on this paper, I have become aware of other related, but independent papers
analyzing cross-country migration patterns: Alvarez-Plata, Brücker, and Siliverstovs (2003), Pedersen, Pyt-
likova, and Smith (2004), Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith (2006). I discuss these very recent contributions
to the literature below, in relation to the data I use and results I ﬁnd in this paper.
7See also Alvarez-Plata, Brücker, and Siliverstovs (2003) for an excellent discussion of the properties of
diﬀerent estimators of the determinants of migration ﬂows.
8Notice that the data set I use only covers legal migration.
9Joppke (1998) writes about Germany’s experience (p.285): "Since the recruitment stop of 1973, the
chain migration of families of guest workers was (next to asylum) one of the two major avenues of continuing
migration ﬂows to Germany, in patent contradiction to the oﬃcial no-immigration policy."
3ing function of the average per worker GDP of all the other host countries in the sample10
(each weighted by the inverse of distance from the origin country). On the other hand, the
sign of the impact of push factors - that is, declining levels of per worker GDP in the origin
country - is seldom negative as theory suggests would be the case with not-binding migration
quotas and, when it is, the size of the eﬀect is smaller than for pull factors and is almost
always insigniﬁcant. Therefore my analysis ﬁnds evidence of an asymmetric impact of pull
a n dp u s hf a c t o r so ne m i g r a t i o nr a t e s . 11
An interpretation that reconciles the results on positive and signiﬁcant pull eﬀects and
small or insigniﬁcant push eﬀects is that migration quotas are eﬀectively not binding but
the impact of income opportunities in the origin country is aﬀected by poverty constraints,
due to ﬁxed costs of migration and credit-market imperfections (Lopez and Schiﬀ 1998,
Yang 2003). Since lower levels of per worker GDP in the source country both strengthen
incentives to leave and make it more diﬃcult to overcome poverty constraints, the net eﬀect
might be close to zero. In the empirical analysis I investigate this possibility and I ﬁnd only
weak evidence that my result on push factors is driven by poverty constraints in the origin
country.
Yet an alternative explanation of my ﬁndings is that the asymmetric eﬀect I estimate for
pull and push factors is explained by the demand side of international migration - namely,
migration policies - and not by the supply side as is often assumed in the previous liter-
ature. Changes in mean income opportunities in the destination country not only aﬀect
migrants’ incentive to move there but also impact the political process behind the formation
of migration policies. For example, in periods of economic booms, policymakers are better
able to overcome political opposition to and accomodate increasing migration inﬂows.12 If
migration quotas are binding, the latter political-economy channel will be at work while
the determinants on the supply side will have no (or a small) impact. This would explain
the asymmetric eﬀect I estimate for pull and push factors. While I do not investigate this
interpretation directly13,Iﬁnd evidence which is consistent with migration policy playing a
constraining role. In the empirical analysis, I diﬀerentiate the eﬀect of pull and push factors
according to changes in destination countries’ migration policy. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of pull
10Since the host countries in the sample receive a large fraction of immigrants in the world, it is not overly
restrictive to focus on them. For example, according to the United Nations (2004), the list of leading host
countries of international migrants in 2000 — as measured by the percentage of the world’s migrant stock in
each of these countries — includes the United States (20%), Germany (4.2%), France (3.6%), Canada (3.3%),
Australia (2.7%), United Kingdom (2.3%), Switzerland (1%), Japan (0.9%), and the Netherlands (0.9%)
(see Table ii.3, p.30). These countries all belong to my sample.
11This result is consistent with the ﬁndings in the literature on internal migration. See, for example, Hunt
(2006), which provides an explanation of the result by breaking down data by age group: Origin region’s
unemployment rates (push factor) have an insigniﬁcant impact on migration ﬂows because the insigniﬁcant
eﬀect for the young — who are not as sensitive to their own layoﬀs as the old — dominates the signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect for the old. See also the related literature on internal migration referenced in Hunt (2006)
(footnote 4).
12Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) focuses on US border enforcement and shows that enforcement softens
when the sectors that use illegal immigrants expand, which is evidence that migration policy is aﬀected by
changes in economic conditions in the destination country.
13This interpretation goes beyond the theoretical model in this paper, which assumes exogenous migration
quotas. The empirical analysis of the endogenous determination of migration policy and its role in explaining
the asymmetric eﬀect of pull and push factors is outside the scope of this paper.
4factors becomes more positive and the impact of push factors turns negative in those years
when a host country’s immigration laws become less restrictive. This is also true for the im-
pact of other supply-side determinants such as geography and demographics (see below). In
sum, my results suggest that migration quotas matter as they mitigate supply-side eﬀects.14
My empirical analysis also ﬁnds that inequality in the source and host economies is related
to the size of emigration rates as predicted by Borjas (1987) selection model. An increase
in the origin country’s relative inequality has a non-monotonic eﬀe c to nt h es i z eo ft h e
emigration rate: the impact is estimated to be positive if there is positive selection, negative
if there is negative selection. Among the variables aﬀecting the costs of migration, distance
between destination and origin countries appears to be the most important one: Its eﬀect is
negative, signiﬁcant and steady across speciﬁcations. On the other hand, there is no evidence
that cultural variables related to each country pair play a signiﬁcant role. Demographics - in
particular, the share of the origin country’s population who is young - shape bilateral ﬂows
as predicted by the theory. Since the eﬀect of geography and demographics works through
the supply side of the model, their impact should be even stronger when migration quotas
are relaxed, which is what I ﬁnd in the data.
Finally, I empirically investigate the importance of network eﬀects. Since immigrants
are likely to receive support from other immigrants from the same origin country already
established in the host country, they will have an incentive to choose destinations with larger
communities of fellow citizens. Network eﬀects imply that bilateral migration ﬂows are highly
correlated over time, which is what the data shows. However, it is not clear how to interpret
this result. While it is consistent with supply factors (that is, network eﬀects), it could also
be driven by demand factors (family reuniﬁcation policies, for example).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of
international migration. In Section 3 I describe the data sets used, while in Section 4 I
discuss the estimating equations and some econometric issues that complicate the analysis.
Finally, I present the main empirical results and robustness checks in, respectively, Section
5 and Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
Both supply and demand factors aﬀect international migration ﬂows. Migrants’ decisions to
move, according to economic and non-economic incentives, shape the supply side of labour
movements. The host country’s immigration policy represents the demand side, namely the
demand for immigrants in the destination country. The theoretical framework in this paper
is closely related to the previous literature (Borjas 1999a, Clark, Hatton and Williamson
2002), the main diﬀerence being the greater emphasis in my model on destination countries’
immigration policy. I consider two countries: country 0, which is the origin of immigrant ﬂows
and country 1, which is the destination. I ﬁrst focus on the supply side of immigration and
14This result is consistent with the ﬁndings in Hatton (2004) where emigration from Britain in the era of
free migration (before 1914) is compared to emigration in 1950 onwards, when immigration policies were in
place in the four main host countries of British migrants. The paper ﬁnds that, from the mid 1960s, the
impact of economic and demographic forces “became less powerful as they were increasingly inhibited by
immigration policies in the principal destination countries.” (p.1)
5look at the probability that an individual chosen randomly from the population of country 0
will migrate to country 1. In each country, wages are a function of the individual skill level
(si). The wages that individual i receives in country 0 and would receive if he migrated to
country 1 are respectively equal to w0i = α0 +θ0 ·si + 0i and w1i = α1 +θ1 ·si + 1i,w h e r e
the two disturbances have zero means over the origin country’s population. In light of the
empirical analysis below, based on aggregate data, it is helpful to rewrite individual i’s wages
in the two locations as a function of ﬁrst and second moments of the income distributions
(of the origin country’s population) at home and abroad respectively:





1 + v1i,where v1i ∼ N(0,σ
2
1), (2)
where the correlation coeﬃcient between v0i and v1i equals ρ01, μ0 equals α0 + θ0 · s0
and μ0
1 equals α1 + θ1 · s0 (s0 is the mean skill level of the origin country’s population).
Notice that μ0
1, which is equal to the mean wage of the origin country’s population if it all
migrated to country 1,i sd i ﬀerent from μ1 = α1 + θ1 · s1,w h i c hi se q u a lt ot h em e a nw a g e
o ft h ed e s t i n a t i o nc o u n t r y ’ sp o p u l a t i o ni nc o u n t r y1 (s1 represents the mean skill level of
the destination country’s population). This point will be relevant in one of the robustness
checks in the empirical analysis.
I assume that each individual has Cobb Douglas preferences for the two goods produced
in the world (xA and xB),15 which implies an indirect utility (function) from having an
income y given by v(pA,p B;y)=A(pA,p B)·y.16 I assume that each country is a small open
economy characterized by free trade with the rest of the world:17 therefore goods’ prices
pA and pB,a sw e l la sA(pA,p B), are given and equal across countries.18 An individual in
country 0 will migrate to country 1 if the utility of moving is greater than the utility of
staying at home that is, given the assumptions above, if the expected income in country
1 net of migration costs is greater than the expected income in country 0.F o l l o w i n g t h e
literature, I can deﬁne an index Ii that measures the net beneﬁt of moving relative to staying
at home for a risk-neutral individual i:19
Ii = η01 · w1i − Ci − w0i,( 3 )
where η01 is the probability that the migrant from country 0 will be allowed to stay in
country 1,a n dCi = μC+vC
i ,w i t hvC
i ∼ N(0,σ2
C), represents the level of individual migration
costs.20 The correlation coeﬃcients between vC
i and (v0i, v1i)a r ee q u a lt o( ρ0C, ρ1C). The
implicit assumption in (3) is that, if the migrant moves to but is not allowed to stay in the
15Preferences are therefore of the following form: U(xA,x B)=Ax
1−δ
A xδ
B, 0 <δ<1, A>0.
16In this expression: A(pA,p B)=A(1−δ
pA )1−δ( δ
pB)δ.
17Given free trade, what explains the diﬀerence in rates of return to labor across countries? The answer
is that, besides free trade, the other conditions for factor-price-equalization are not satisﬁed: for example, if
international productivity diﬀerences exist (Treﬂer 1993), then only adjusted factor-price-equalization holds.
18In the empirical analysis I adjust for international diﬀerences in goods’ prices, using PPP income levels.
19The index Ii does not include a capital-income term because capital is assumed to be internationally
mobile (and therefore rates of return to capital are equalized across countries).
20I assume that each individual knows the wage levels w1i and w0i he would get in each location, the
migration costs Ci and the probability η01.
6destination country, he still incurs the migration costs Ci and gives up the home wage w0i.
In other words, the individual migrates to the host country before knowing whether he will
be able to stay (for a longer period of time) and gain the income w1i.21 Immigrants may not
be able to stay in the host country because of quotas due to a restrictive immigration policy.
The probability that an individual chosen randomly from the population of the origin
country will migrate from country 0 to country 1 therefore equals:
P =P r [ Ii > 0] = Pr[η01 · (μ
0
1 + v1i) − (μC + v
C
i ) − (μ0 + v0i) > 0],( 4 )
which can be rewritten as P =1− Φ(z),w h e r ez = −
(η01·μ0
1−μ0−μC)
σv , σv is the standard
deviation of (η01·v1i−v0i−vC
i ),a n dΦ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard
normal.22 The probability in (4) is the supply emigration rate
IS
01
P0 ,w h e r eIS
01 represents the
size of the migration ﬂow as determined by the supply side of the model and P0 the population
in the origin country.
Next, I assume that the destination country’s immigration policy sets quantity constraints
for immigrants coming from each origin country. Let ID
01 be the maximum number of migrants
from country 0 a l l o w e de a c hy e a ri n t oc o u n t r y1. These immigration quotas, which represent
country 1’s demand for immigrants from country 0, may or may not be binding. Only in the
latter case does the emigration rate we observe in the data (I01
















P0 , and is represented in Figure 2 by the heavy lines, as a function of μ0
1 and μh,
h =0 , C.T h eﬁgure assumes that quotas ID
01 are exogenous, which means that they are not
aﬀected by μ0
1 nor by μh, h =0 , C. This is a strong assumption that is questioned in the
interpretation of the empirical results.
I assume that the probability η01 that the migrant from country 0 will be allowed to stay
in country 1 is equal to min{1,
ID
01
P0·P} (the number of people, from country 0 to country 1,
who are allowed in, divided by the number of those who try to get in). It is then possible
to derive testable predictions for the impact of μ0
1, μ0,a n dμC on the emigration rate from











































21This assumption is consistent with the evidence that immigrants often arrive to a destination country






C − 2η01ρ01σ0σ1 − 2η01ρ1Cσ1σC +2 ρ0Cσ0σC).
23The emigration rate we observe in the data, I01
P0 , equals the actual number of immigrants from country
0 to country 1, divided by the population of country 0.




1 − μ0 − μC)+φ(z)( η01μ0
1 − μ0 − μC)(− 1
σ2
v)dσv.
7where φ(·) is the density function of a standard normal and h =0 , C.A c c o r d i n g t o
(5) pull eﬀects (namely, improvements in the mean income opportunities in the destination
country) are positive and strongest when restrictions are not binding neither ex-ante nor ex-
post, they are positive but smaller in size when the quota is binding ex-post but not ex-ante
and, ﬁnally, they are equal to zero in a quantity-constrained world. A parallel interpretation
explains the comparative-static results in (6), which describe push eﬀects (changes of μ0,
that is mean income opportunities in the origin country) and the impact of mean migration
costs (changes of μC), according to the immigration-policy regime.
Thus, according to this simple model, pull and push factors have either similar-sized
eﬀects (with opposite signs), when quotas are not binding, or they both have no (or a small)
eﬀect on emigration rates, when quotas are binding. In the empirical analysis I will not be
able to control for whether migration quotas are binding for a country pair in a given year
(since I do not have data on ID
01). Therefore I will estimate an average eﬀect across country
pairs with diﬀerent degrees of restrictiveness. However, I will be able to use information
on changes in ID
01:Is h o u l dﬁnd that pull (push) eﬀects are more positive (negative) than
average, for a given destination country, if that country’s migration policy becomes less
restrictive.25
Focusing for simplicity on the region where immigration quotas are not binding, it is
straightforward to derive predictions for the impact of second moments of the income distri-
butions (of the origin country’s population) at home and abroad respectively. In particular,




= k · (μ
0




= k · (μ
0
1 − μ0 − μC) · (σ0 − ρ01σ1).( 8 )
In my discussion I will assume that (μ0
1 − μ0 − μC) > 0 so that, based on ﬁrst-moments
considerations, on average immigrants have an incentive to migrate. The results in (7) and
(8) imply that, if σ0
σ1 < 1 and ρ01 is suﬃciently high (ρ01 > σ0
σ1), then dσ0 > 0 or dσ1 < 0
(i.e., an increase in the relative inequality σ0
σ1) will increase the emigration rate. Similarly, if
σ0
σ1 > 1 and ρ01 is suﬃciently high (ρ01 > σ1
σ0), then dσ0 > 0 or dσ1 < 0 (i.e., an increase in
the relative inequality σ0
σ1) will decrease the emigration rate.
3D a t a
In this paper, I merge data from an international migration panel with macroeconomic
and other information on the origin and destination countries of immigrant ﬂows. Data on
25The reason is that, with higher ID
01,t h er a n g eo fμ0
1 (μ0)f o rw h i c ht h ee ﬀect is strictly positive (negative)
is wider (see Figure 2).
26Formulas (7) and (8) are based on the expression for dP in footnote 24 (given that immigration quotas
are not binding, then I01




2[(σ1 −ρ01σ0)dσ1 +(σ0 −ρ01σ1)dσ0 −σ0σ1dρ01]. Notice that, in formula (7) and (8),
k = φ(z)(σ2
1 + σ2




8immigration comes from the International Migration Statistics (IMS) data set for OECD
countries (OECD 1997), which provides information on bilateral immigrant ﬂows based on
the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on Migration (SOPEMI).27 In particular, I use
data on yearly immigrant inﬂows into fourteen OECD countries by country of origin, in
the period 1980-1995.28 Appendix 1, at the end of the paper, presents summary statistics
on immigrant inﬂows by host and source country, averaged over the years 1980-1995. It
shows that labor movements to the fourteen OECD countries are both South-North and
North-North ﬂows. The sample includes seventy-nine origin countries with per worker GDP
levels ranging from approximately $1,000 to $55,000 (PPP-adjusted) on average in the period
considered. In interpreting the numbers in Appendix 1, notice that the IMS data only covers
legal immigration; population registers and residence and work permits are the main sources
of these statistics.29
The quality of the IMS data is high even though the coverage is not complete. The data
set is supposed to cover immigrant inﬂows into each of the fourteen destination countries
from all over the world. However, the sum by country of origin of the IMS numbers is not
equal to 100% of the total ﬂow into each destination country. The percentage of the total
immigrant inﬂow covered by the disaggregate data ranges between 45% (Belgium) and 84%
(United States). Put diﬀerently, the data set includes zero ﬂows in correspondence of some
country pairs (immigrant inﬂows from Italy to the United States, for example): some of
these observations correspond to truly zero ﬂows, while others are likely to correspond to
very small ﬂows. If the latter observations are recorded as zeros in the disaggregate data set,
there will be a discrepancy between total ﬂows and the sum of ﬂows by origin country. In
the empirical analysis I will keep zero-ﬂows observations in the data set. I will investigate
the robustness of my results to excluding zero-ﬂows observations and to using a Tobit model.
Summary statistics and data sources for the other regressors used in the empirical model
are documented in Appendix 2. Data on macroeconomic variables comes from various
sources: the 2001 World Development Indicators data set (World Bank 2001), the Penn
World Tables (versions 5.6 and 6.1), and the World Bank’s Global Development Network
Growth Database, Macro Time Series (Easterly and Sewadeh 2002). Geographic and cul-
tural information, such as on great-circle distance30, land border, common language, and
colonial ties, comes from Glick and Rose’s (2002) data set on gravity-model variables. I also
use statistics on the average number of schooling years in the total population of destina-
tion and origin countries (over age 15) from Barro and Lee’s (2000) data set.31 Data on
27Alvarez-Plata, Brücker, and Siliverstovs (2003) and Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith (2004) use diﬀerent
international-migration data sets: the former paper uses the Eurostat Labor Force Survey which covers all
destination countries within the EU-15 over nine years; the latter paper uses a dataset constructed by the
authors after contacting the statistical bureaus in 27 selected destination countries (this data set covers the
years between 1990 and 2000).
28The OECD (1997) data can be accessed through SourceOECD. Unfortunately, data for the years after
1995 is not yet available.
29Although the migration data is not perfectly comparable across OECD countries (some countries in the
OECD (1997) data set deﬁne immigrants based on country of birth, while others based on citizenship), it is
reasonable to think that changes over time can be compared.
30Distance is calculated with the great circle formula using each capital city’s latitude and longitude data.
31Since this panel only contains data at ﬁve-year intervals (in the period I consider, the years covered are
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995), I linearly extrapolate ﬁgures for the in-between years (by assigning one ﬁfth of the
9Gini coeﬃcients of destination and origin countries, used to construct the origin country’s
relative inequality variable, comes from Deininger and Squire (1996) data set (I only used
so called “high-quality observations”)32. Finally, information on origin countries’ share of
young population comes from the United Nations.
Figure 1 shows that many destination countries in the sample are characterized by sub-
stantial volatility of immigrant inﬂows year after year. An important cause of variation over
time in the number of immigrants to a given destination country is changes in that country’s
migration policy. For example, the United States graph in Figure 1 displays a peak around
the year 1990. This is not surprising given that an amnesty law, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act, was passed in 1986 and put in eﬀect in the following years, with the bulk
of the legalizations taking place in 1989-1991. The graph for Japan, on the other hand, dis-
plays a sudden decrease in the total immigrant inﬂow around the year 1982, which is when
the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was passed. A separate Appendix
to the paper documents the main characteristics of the migration policies of the destination
countries in the sample and the timing (after 1980) of changes in their legislations (Mayda
and Patel, 2004).33 A data set of destination countries’ migration-policy changes, between
1980 and 1995, was constructed on the basis of the information in this Appendix and used
in the empirical analysis.34
4 Empirical model
According to the theoretical framework in Section 2, the estimating equation should be
characterized by the emigration rate as the dependent variable and, among the explanatory
variables, the mean wage of the origin country’s population in, respectively, the origin and
destination countries. As approximations for the latter two variables, I use the (log) level of
per worker GDP, PPP-adjusted (constant 1996 international dollars) in the two countries.35
Based on the theoretical model, I expect pull and push eﬀects to be, respectively, positive and
negative on average, if migration quotas are not binding, and both zero (or small) otherwise.
Another determinant of bilateral immigration ﬂows implied by the model of Section 2 is
the physical distance between the two locations, which aﬀects migration costs Ci.T h ef u r t h e r
away the two countries are, the higher the monetary travel costs for the initial move, as well
as for visits back home. Remote destinations may also discourage migration because they
ﬁve-year change in the variable to each year).
32I linearly extrapolate data on Gini coeﬃcients for the years in which it is not available, based on the
values for other years for the same country.
33The Appendix (Mayda and Patel 2004) can be found at the author’s Georgetown University website.
34In particular, the information in the Appendix (and in the background papers listed in the References)
was used to identify: ﬁrst, the timing of immigration-policy changes taking place in each destination country
(the years in which migration policy laws were passed or enforced); second, the direction of the change in
the case of substantial changes (loosening vs. tightening), based on a qualitative assessment of the laws (we
mainly focused on aspects of migration policies related to the size of immigration ﬂows, as opposed to, for
example, issues of citizenship).
35Unfortunately, wage data cannot be used because wage income series are not available for all countries
(especially origin ones) in the sample. Since per worker GDP is not a direct measure of the mean wage of the
origin country’s population at home and abroad, I run robustness checks at the end of the paper to check
that it is a good proxy for it.
10require longer travel time and thus higher foregone earnings. Another explanation as to why
distance may negatively aﬀect migration is that it is more costly to acquire information ex-
ante about far-away countries (Greenwood 1997, Lucas 2000). Besides distance, I introduce
additional variables that aﬀect the level of migration costs Ci. A common land border is
likely to encourage migration ﬂows, since land travel is usually less expensive than air travel.
Linguistic and cultural similarity are also likely to reduce the magnitude of migration costs,
for example by improving the transferability of individual skill from one place to the other.
Past colonial relationships should increase emigration rates, to the extent that they translate
into similar institutions and stronger political ties between the two countries, thus decreasing
the level of migration costs Ci.
In a cross-country analysis, such as in this paper, unobserved country-speciﬁce ﬀects
could result in biased estimates. For example, the estimate of the coeﬃcient on the des-
tination country’s per worker GDP may be positive. Based on this result, it is not clear
whether immigrants go to countries with higher wages or, alternatively, whether countries
with higher wages have other characteristics that attract immigrants. Along the same lines,
an e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on income at home leaves open the question of whether immigrants
leave countries with lower wages or, alternatively, whether countries with lower wages have
certain features that push immigrants to leave. To (partly) get around this problem, I exploit
the panel structure of the data set and I introduce dummy variables for both destination and
origin countries. This allows me to control for unobserved country-speciﬁce ﬀects which are
additive and time-invariant.36 All the regressions also have robust standard errors clustered
by country pair, to address heteroscedasticity and allow for correlation over time of country-
pair observations. Notice that destination countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects also allow me to control
for features of their immigration policy which are time-invariant and common across origin
countries. In order to capture the eﬀect of changes in destination countries’ migration poli-
cies, I introduce two interaction terms of an indicator variable of such changes with pull and
push factors, respectively. According to the theory, if the migration policy of a destination
country becomes less restrictive, the eﬀect of pull (push) factors should turn more positive
(negative).
Finally, I introduce the share of the origin country’s population who is young (between 15
and 29 years old) as a demographic determinant of migration ﬂows. Consider an extension
of the basic model in Section 2 to a multi-period setting. In this set-up, the individual cares
not only about current wage diﬀerentials net of moving costs, but about future ones too. As
Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2002) point out, this implies that a potential migrant from
country 0 will have a bigger incentive to migrate the younger he is, as the present discounted
value of net beneﬁts will be higher the longer the remaining work life time is (for positive Ii
in each year). We would then expect the share of the young population in the origin country
to positively aﬀect the emigration rate out of that country.
The basic empirical speciﬁcation thus looks as follows:37
36In one robustness check, I control for country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects. In all the other regressions (based on
pooled data), I include separate destination and origin countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects.
37The basic empirical speciﬁcation below also includes destination and origin countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects, as
explained above.
11flowijt
Pit = β + β0pwgdpit−1 + β1pwgdpjt−1 + β2distij + β3borderij + β4comlangij + β5colonyij+
+β6pwgdpit−1 · immigpoljt + β7pwgdpjt−1 · immigpoljt + β8youngpopit−1 + εijt
(9)
where i is the origin country, j the destination country and t time.
flowijt
Pit is the emigration
rate from i to j at time t (flowijt is the inﬂow into country j from country i at time t, Pit
is the population of the origin country at time t). pwgdp is the (log) per worker GDP,
PPP-adjusted (constant 1996 international dollars) and dist measures the (log) great-circle
distance between the two countries. The variable border equals one if the two countries in
the pair share a land border. comlang and colony are two dummy variables equal to one,
respectively, if a common language is spoken in the two locations, and for pairs of countries
which were, at some point in the past, in a colonial relationship. The variable immigpol
increases by one (decreases by one) if in that year the destination country’s immigration
policy became less (more) restrictive, zero otherwise.38 Finally, youngpop is the share of the
population in the origin country aged 15-29 years old. According to the model in Section 2,
Ie x p e c tt h a tβ0 ≤ 0, β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≤ 0, β3 ≥ 0, β4 ≥ 0, β5 ≥ 0, β6 < 0, β7 > 0,a n dβ8 ≥ 0.
An econometric complication is the possibility of reverse causality and, more in general,
of endogeneity in the time-series dimension of the analysis. For example, the theoretical
model in Section 2 predicts that, ceteris paribus, better (worse) income opportunities in
the destination (origin) country increase emigration rates. However, a positive β1 (negative
β0)m a yj u s tr e ﬂect causation in the opposite direction, that is the impact of immigrant
ﬂows on wages in host and source countries. After all, this channel is the main focus of
analysis in many labour-economics papers (see Friedberg and Hunt (1995) for a survey of
this literature).39 More broadly, other time-variant third factors may drive contemporaneous
wages and immigrant ﬂows.
As for reverse causality, notice that it is likely to bias the estimates toward zero. The
reason is that, if anything, immigrant inﬂows are likely to decrease wages in the destination
country and outﬂows are likely to increase wages in the origin country. While the oppo-
site signs are a theoretical possibility (for example, in the economic-geography literature,
because of economies of scale), the empirical evidence in the labor-economics literature is
that immigrant inﬂows have a negative or zero impact on the destination country’s wages
(Friedberg and Hunt 1995, Borjas 2003) and that immigrant outﬂows have a positive impact
on the origin country’s wages (Mishra 2003).
Although reverse causality may not be an issue, it is still important to address other
sources of endogeneity, in the following two ways. First of all, in the basic speciﬁcation, I
relate current emigration rates to lagged values of (log) per worker GDP, at home and abroad
(I use lagged values also for all the other time-varying regressors). While it is unrealistic to
claim that wages at home and abroad are strictly exogenous, it is plausible to assume that
they are predetermined, in the sense that immigrant inﬂows - and third factors in the error
38In other words, a change in policy is modelled as leading to a lasting eﬀect (i.e., in the year when the
policy change occurred and in the following years).
39At the same time, given that in this paper the dependent variable is immigration ﬂows (as opposed to
stocks), reverse causality may be less of an issue.
12term - can only aﬀect contemporaneous and future wages.40 As a robustness check, I also use
instrumental-variables estimation with countries’ terms of trade as an instrument for PPP-
adjusted income levels in destination and origin countries. Papers in the literature where
shocks to terms of trade are used as instruments for growth rates of income are, for example,
Pritchett and Summers (1996) and Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993).
5 Empirical results
Table 1 presents the results from estimation of equation (9) controlling for destination and
origin countries’ ﬁxed eﬀects. The estimates show a systematic pattern, broadly consistent
with the theoretical predictions of the international migration model. The analysis also
generates empirical puzzles.
First, the emigration rate is positively related to the destination country’s (log) per
worker GDP.41 According to the estimate in regression (1), a ten percent increase in the
level of per worker GDP in the destination country increases emigration by 2.5 emigrants
per 100,000 individuals of the origin country’s population (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). In
other words, a 10% increase in the host country’s per worker GDP implies a 19% increase in
the emigration rate (as the mean of the dependent variable is, in regression (1), 13 emigrants
per 100,000 individuals). This result would suggest that migration quotas are not binding
on average across destination countries. However, the impact on the emigration rate of a
change in the income opportunities at home is not consistent with this interpretation. Push
eﬀects are estimated to be insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in Table 1. One possibility is
that, in practice, migration quotas are not binding, but push factors are zero due to the
eﬀect of poverty constraints in the origin country. I will investigate this hypothesis in Table
2.
In regressions (1)-(3), Table 1, I also explore the role played by geographic (log distance
and land border), cultural (common language and colony), and demographic (share of
young population (origin)) determinants, respectively. The picture that emerges from my
results is one in which geography and demographics are the most important among this set
of drivers of migration ﬂows. According to the estimate in column (1), doubling the great-
circle distance between the source and host country decreases the number of emigrants by
41 per 100,000 individuals in the origin country (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). On the other
hand, a common land border does not appear to play a signiﬁcant role. The impact of a
common language, though of the right sign, is not statistically signiﬁcant and, surprisingly,
past colonial relationships do not appear to aﬀect migration rates.42 Finally, the share of the
origin country’s population who is young has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on emigration
rates. A ten percentage point increase in the origin country’s 15-29 years old population
40Strict exogeneity of an explanatory variable implies E[Xitεis]=0 ,f o r∀s, t, while predeterminacy
implies E[Xitεis]=0 ,f o r∀s>t . In one of the following speciﬁcations, I also control for lagged values of
the emigration rate, since if the emigration rate is autocorrelated, predeterminacy of the regressors does not
guarantee consistency of the estimates.
41I constrain the sample of observations to be the same in the pooled regressions of this table and of the
other tables (whenever data availability makes it possible).
42This statement is true whether common language and colony are entered in the regression together or
one at a time.
13raises the emigration rate by 24 emigrants per 100,000 individuals (regression (3)). These
results are conﬁrmed in column (4) where, out of all the geographic, cultural and demographic
determinants, I only include the ones which are signiﬁcant based on regressions (1)-(3), that
is log distance and share of young population (origin).
In the next regression (column (5)) I only exploit the variation over time within country
pairs, by introducing ﬁxed eﬀects for each combination of origin and destination countries.43
These country-pairs dummy variables allow me to control for time-invariant features of the
destination country’s immigration policy which are speciﬁc for each origin country. The
results from this speciﬁcation conﬁrm that push and pull factors have an asymmetric eﬀect
in terms of magnitudes and signiﬁcance levels.44
The framework used in regressions (1)-(5) to study migration ﬂo w si sr e l a t e dt ot h e
gravity model of trade, which is employed to analyze bilateral trade ﬂo w sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e s . 45
As a matter of fact, I use several variables that appear frequently in the trade gravity
literature (log distance, land border, common language,a n dcolony). The speciﬁcations in
the following three columns ((6)-(8)) use the same regressors as in regression (4) but are
more closely related to trade gravity-model regressions, which are usually estimated in a
cross section. That is, in regressions (6)-(8) I only exploit the cross-country variation in the
data by estimating the model year by year (I focus on three years: 1985, 1990, and 1995)46
Due to the low number of observations in each year, I do not control for country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects, which could explain the diﬀerence in magnitudes of the eﬀects relative to previous
regressions. However, the coeﬃcients are still qualitatively consistent with the panel-data
estimates.
Next, I investigate the interaction between changes in destination countries’ migration
policies and, respectively, pull and push factors (column (9), Table 1). Consistent with the
theoretical predictions, positive pull factors are bigger than average for a destination country
whose migration policy becomes less restrictive. Setting aside the average eﬀect, push factors
turn negative and signiﬁcant once migration restrictions are relaxed. The opposite is true
when policy becomes more protectionist. In the same regression I also add the interaction of
the indicator variable of changes in destination countries’ migration policy with, respectively,
log distance and share of young population (origin).I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the latter
two variables is more pronounced (more negative and more positive, respectively) when a
host country’s immigration laws turn less restrictive. The opposite is true when policy
becomes more protectionist. These results do no change when I include the main eﬀect of
43Therefore I do not include the regressors log distance, land border, common language and colony since
they are constant within country pairs and, therefore, would be perfectly collinear with the dummy variables.
44If country pairs diﬀer in terms of out-migration and return migration rates, net migration ﬂows can be
very diﬀerent from gross ﬂows. Since out-migration and return migration are likely to characterize speciﬁc
country pairs, they are accounted for by including country-pair ﬁxed eﬀects.
45There exists a gravity model of immigration, developed in the geography literature and sometimes used
in economics papers. The empirical speciﬁcation I use, suggested by economic theory, diﬀers in part from the
standard equation estimated by geographers, which looks as follows (Gallup 1997): flowij ∝
PiPj
dist2
ij .T h a ti s ,
there is still a contrast between economic and gravity explanations of immigrant ﬂows (Helliwell 1997).
46I also estimate the model in 1981-1985, in 1986-1990 and in 1991-1995 (results not shown) and get very
similar estimates (that is, I conﬁrm the asymmetry between pull and push factors). In particular, in these
regressions, I relate average emigration rates in each subperiod to the average income opportunities at home
and abroad in the previous ﬁve-year interval (plus time-invariant variables).
14immigration policy changes (regression (10)), which has an insigniﬁcant impact. Regression
(9) represents the preferred speciﬁcation of the model. It shows that migration restrictions
matter by mitigating eﬀects on the supply side of the model (pull and push factors, geography
and demographics).
In Table 2, I analyze economic determinants more in detail. First, I investigate the impact
of the second moments of the income distributions in the origin and destination countries.





σ1 increases, the emigration rate will increase, while given high
values of σ0
σ1,i fσ0
σ1 increases, the emigration rate will decrease.47 The intuition for these results
is straightforward. If income inequality in the origin country is lower than in the destination
country (σ0
σ1 < 1), there is positive selection of immigrants from country 0 to country 1:
migrants are selected from the upper tail of the income distribution at home and end up in
the upper tail of the income distribution abroad (in both cases, the relevant distribution is
the origin country’s population one). For example, consider potential migrants from Portugal
to the United States. Given that income inequality is lower in Portugal than in the U.S.,
among Portuguese workers it is the better-oﬀ who have an incentive to migrate while those
a tt h ev e r yl o wt a i lo ft h ei n c o m ec u r v eh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et os t a y . T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h e
probability of both very high and very low incomes is higher in the U.S. than in Portugal.
An increase in income inequality in Portugal will make the marginal individual (who is in
the lower tail of the income distribution) relatively worse-oﬀ at home and will increase her
incentive to leave. Similarly, if income is more dispersed at home than abroad (σ0
σ1 > 1),
then there is negative selection of immigrants from country 0 to country 1: migrants are
selected from the lower tail of the income distribution at home and end up in the lower tail
of the income distribution abroad. An example of this situation is migration from Brazil
to the U.S., given that income inequality in the latter is lower than in the former.48 An
increase in income inequality in Brazil will lower the emigration rate because those who were
not migrating beforehand, the better-oﬀ, will have even less incentive to do so afterwards.
In order to test these predictions, I introduce in the estimating equation a measure of the
origin country’s relative inequality (
σ0
σ1) both in linear and quadratic forms. As expected, I
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the linear term is positive and on the quadratic term is negative
(both signiﬁcant at the 5% level), which is consistent with Borjas (1987) selection model
(regressions (1)-(2)49,T a b l e2 ) . 50
47I assume that ρ01 is suﬃciently high (ρ01 > max{σ0
σ1, σ1
σ0}). The motivation for this assumption is
explained in Borjas (1987): "It seems plausible to argue that for non-Communist countries, ρ01 is likely to
be positive and large. After all, proﬁt-maximizing employers are likely to value the same factors in any market
economy" (p.534). I also assume that (μ0
1 −μ0 −μC) > 0 so that, based on ﬁrst-moments considerations, on
average immigrants have an incentive to migrate. The motivation for the last assumption is that the data set
mostly includes migration ﬂows from lower to higher average-income countries: the average diﬀerence in per
capita GDP levels of destination and origin countries is positive and substantial (approximately $20,600). I
also add a robustness check (regression (2), Table 2) where I only include observations characterized by a
positive diﬀerence between the per capita GDP levels of destination and origin countries in any given year.
48The Gini coeﬃcient for Portugal was 36.76 in 1990, while in the U.S. it was 37.8. The Gini coeﬃcient
for Brazil was 61.76 in 1985, while in the U.S. it was 37.26 (Deininger and Squire 1996).
49See footnote 47 for a discussion of regression (2), Table 2.
50Ie v a l u a t et h ee ﬀect of relative inequality over the relevant range of values. Based on the coeﬃcient
estimates in column (1), Table 2, the threshold value of relative inequality is approximately equal to 2.73805:
15The remaining speciﬁcations in Table 2 investigate empirically a few extensions of the
theoretical framework of Section 2. First, it is possible to incorporate poverty constraints
in the model, due to ﬁxed costs of migration and credit market imperfections in the origin
country. As Yang (2003) shows, these assumptions imply that the eﬀect on emigration rates
of income opportunities at home is non-monotonic, positive at very low levels of income and
negative for higher levels. Accordingly, I extend the empirical model previously speciﬁed by
introducing both a linear and a quadratic term in per worker GDP of the origin country. I
ﬁnd only weak evidence of poverty constraints in regression (3). The sign of the coeﬃcients
is consistent with the theory but the low signiﬁcance level of the estimates prevents me from
reading too much support into them.51 This result thus leaves unanswered the question of
why push and pull eﬀects are diﬀerent in size and, indirectly, lends support to the alternative
hypothesis of binding (and endogenous) migration quotas.
Next, the theoretical model can be modiﬁed by taking into account uncertainty in ﬁnding
a job in each place. This extension suggests using the unemployment rate (which is approx-
imately equal to one minus the probability of ﬁnding a job) as a regressor in the estimating
equation. My results in column (4) conﬁrm the asymmetry between push and pull factors,
this time in terms of unemployment rates. In an additional extension (column (5)), I test
whether workers choose among multiple destination countries. In the theoretical model, the
choice is between the origin country and one particular destination country. In practice,
however, potential migrants are likely to compare mean income opportunities in their origin
country to those in the destination country considered and in any other host country.F o r
each pair of source and host economies, I construct and control for a multilateral pull term
which is an average of per worker GDP levels of all the other destination countries in the
sample, each weighted by the inverse of distance from the origin country. Regression (5)
shows that third-country eﬀects shape bilateral migration ﬂows as expected, given that the
coeﬃcient on the multilateral pull term is indeed negative and signiﬁcant (at the 5% level).52
To conclude, I investigate the role of past migration ﬂows to the destination country
from the same origin country. Lagged emigration rates capture the impact of network eﬀects,
which are likely to reduce the cost Ci of migration. The introduction of the lagged emigration
rate among the explanatory variables makes the model a dynamic one. I use Arellano and
Bond’s GMM estimator to deal with the incidental parameter problem that arises with ﬁxed-
eﬀects estimation of such a dynamic equation.53 Emigration rates show considerable inertia
in regression (6), where the coeﬃcient on the lagged emigration rate is 0.66 (signiﬁcant
if σ0
σ1 is below this value (which is the case in my sample, based on the summary statistics in Appendix 2),
an increase in σ0
σ1 raises the emigration rate which is consistent with positive selection taking place.
51In contrast with my results — which are only marginally signiﬁcant — Hatton and Williamson (2003)
and Pedersen, Pytlikova and Smith (2004) ﬁnd evidence of an inverted U-shaped eﬀect on emigration of the
origin country’s economic conditions.
52The multilateral pull term places migrants’ decision to move in a multi-country framework. It is inspired
by the multilateral trade resistance term in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) (even though mine is an
atheoretical measure).
53The Arellano and Bond estimator transforms into a diﬀerence the initial equation to remove the country-
pair ﬁxed eﬀect and produces an equation that can be estimated with instrumental variables using a gener-
alized method-of-moments estimator. The instruments include the lagged values of the dependent variable
starting from t-4-2 (since the regression includes, as regressors, the emigration rate lagged by one, two, three
and four years).
16at the 1% level).54 However, outside the model of Section 2 — which assumes exogenous
migration quotas — it is unclear how to interpret this autocorrelation. While it is consistent
with network eﬀects on the supply side, it could also be driven by factors working on the
demand side. In particular, through the latter channel, past migration ﬂows can inﬂuence
the emigration rate in two diﬀerent ways: through family-reuniﬁcation immigration policies
and through political-economy factors (see, for example, Goldin (1994) and Ortega (2005),
where the votes of naturalized immigrants aﬀect immigration-policy outcomes).
6R o b u s t n e s s c h e c k s
In Table 3 I run a few robustness checks of my previous results. In the ﬁrst regression,
I use (within-country variation in) the terms of trade of destination and origin countries,
respectively, to instrument for (within-country variation in) their level of per worker GDP.
Since terms of trade are deﬁned as the price of a country’s exports divided by the price
of its imports, they represent how much a country can import per unit of exported good.
Thus, they are correlated with the average real income of a country because they aﬀect its
purchasing power vis a vis goods produced by the rest of the world. In the ﬁrst stage, the
impact of the terms of trade of destination countries (origin countries) on their per worker
GDP is positive and signiﬁc a n ta tt h e1 %l e v e l . I na d d i t i o n ,t h eFv a l u ef o rt h ee x c l u d e d
instruments (terms of trade) is equal to 30.47 and 70.36 in the ﬁrst stage of per worker
GDP of destination and origin countries, respectively. Finally, if the assumption of small
open economies holds55, terms of trade are unlikely to aﬀect emigration rates directly or
to be correlated with other country-level characteristics that have an impact on migration
patterns (exclusion restriction). Regression (1) shows that pull and push coeﬃcients are
robust to endogeneity issues as the instrumental variable estimates are consistent with my
earlier results. In particular, this regression conﬁrms the asymmetry between push and pull
factors.
My second robustness check investigates whether per worker GDP (PPP-adjusted) of
origin and destination countries is a good proxy for mean income opportunities of migrant
workers at home and abroad. Per worker GDP is not a direct measure of wages of a potential
migrant, since it depends on rates of return to both capital and labor and on endowments
of each factor. For example, a higher per worker GDP in the destination country does not
necessarily mean better income opportunities on average for an immigrant worker, since it
could be due to a higher capital-labor ratio or to a more skilled labor force in the destination
country’s population. To address this concern, I run a robustness check where I control for
the mean skill level and per worker endowment of capital in each country (columns (2) and
(3))56.I ﬁrst control for the average schooling level in both countries in speciﬁcation (2).
54Regression (6) includes, as regressors, the emigration rate lagged by one, two, three and four years (the
coeﬃcients on the latter three lags are not shown in the table). The reason is that, only by introducing
all these lags, I don’t reject the null of zero autocovariance in residuals of order 2 (which is one of the
requirements of the Arellano and Bond estimator).
55There is debate about how large a country must be in order to have an impact on its terms of trade.
Irwin (2002) argues that the United States, for example, should be considered as small in almost all markets,
while Feenstra (2004) has the opposite view.
56Since capital is assumed to be internationally mobile, there are no international diﬀerences in rates of
17I still estimate pull eﬀects which are positive and signiﬁcant (at the 1% level). The results
on push eﬀects are the same as in previous estimates as well. In line with the theoretical
predictions, the average skill level in the population of the destination (origin) country has
a negative (positive) impact on the emigration rate. In column (3) I control for per worker
endowments of both skill and capital and ﬁnd that their coeﬃcients are of the right sign.
In addition, my prior ﬁndings on pull and push factors are robust. Finally, the last two
regressions in Table 3 (columns (4)-(5)) test how robust the results are — in particular, in
terms of the asymmetry between pull and push factors — to excluding zero-ﬂows observations
a n dt ou s i n gaT o b i ts p e c i ﬁcation. These estimates are again consistent with the picture
based on OLS and IV regressions.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, I empirically investigate the determinants of international bilateral migration
ﬂows. This analysis both delivers estimates consistent with the predictions of the interna-
tional migration model and generates empirical puzzles.
In particular, I ﬁnd evidence that pull factors, that is improvements in the mean income
opportunities in the destination country, signiﬁcantly increase the size of emigration rates.
This result is very robust to changes in the speciﬁcation of the empirical model. On the other
hand, the sign of the impact of push factors - that is, declining levels of per worker GDP in
the origin country - is seldom negative and, when it is, the size of the eﬀect is smaller than
for pull factors and is almost always insigniﬁcant. Therefore the evidence uncovered by the
estimates is mixed in terms of the migration-policy regime that characterizes, on average,
the destination countries in the sample: Push eﬀects suggest that migration quotas are more
binding than pull eﬀects do. A possible explanation of the asymmetry between push and
pull factors is the role played by the demand side of the model, that is destination countries’
migration policies. While the theoretical framework of Section 2 assumes that migration
quotas are exogenous, in practice they are not. Indeed migration policies can be thought
of as the outcome of a political-economy model in which voters’ attitudes towards immi-
grants, interest-groups pressure, policy-makers preferences and the institutional structure of
government interact with each other and give rise to a ﬁnal immigration-policy outcome (Ro-
drik 1995, Facchini and Willmann 2005, Mayda 2006).57 Binding and endogenous migration
quotas can explain the asymmetric eﬀect I estimate for pull and push factors. While I do
not investigate the endogenous determination of migration policy, I ﬁnd evidence consistent
with the constraining role played by migration policies. In the empirical analysis, I interact
an indicator variable of changes in destination countries’ migration policies with pull and
push factors, respectively. I ﬁnd that pull eﬀects become more positive and push eﬀects turn
negative in those years when a host country’s immigration laws become less restrictive.
return to capital.
57In a political-economy framework, the immigration quotas are likely to depend on the capital-labor ratio
of the median voter (see Benhabib 1996), on the size of past immigration ﬂows from the same origin country,
both because of family-reuniﬁcation policies and because of pro-immigration votes of naturalized immigrants
(Ortega 2005), on the extent of political organization of various interest groups (Grossman and Helpman
1994, Facchini and Willmann 2005) and on the business cycle.
18Among the variables aﬀecting the costs of migration, distance appears to be the most
important one. Its eﬀect is negative, signiﬁcant and quite steady across speciﬁcations. De-
mographics, in particular the share of the origin country’s population who is young, represent
as i g n i ﬁcant determinant of emigration rates as well. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect of both variables is
more pronounced in those years when a host country’s immigration laws become less restric-
tive. In sum, my results suggest that migration quotas matter: They mitigate supply-side
eﬀects, that is pull and push factors, geography and demographics.
The investigation of the determinants of international migration leads to other interesting
research questions. As already pointed out, the framework used in this paper to study mi-
gration ﬂows is related to the gravity model of trade, which is used to analyze bilateral trade
ﬂows across countries. A common framework of empirical analysis for trade and migration
makes it possible to combine the study of these two dimensions of international integration.
In addition, while this paper looks at the determinants of international migration, it pro-
vides a framework to analyze the impact of migration, on source and host economies - on
their standards of living, for example. The analysis of the impact of migration is usually
aﬀected by problems of reverse causality and endogeneity. Since my paper helps identify the
determinants of immigrant ﬂows - some of which are possibly exogenous - it is possible to
use its results to construct a ﬁrst stage (as in the trade gravity-model literature — see Frankel
and Romer (1999), for example).
To conclude, by taking advantage of both the time-series and cross-country variation in
an annual panel data set, this paper makes progress in explaining the determinants of inter-
national migration ﬂows and in providing a framework for future analyses of their impact.
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23Equation 123456789 1 0
Dependent variable
log per worker gdp (destination) 24.62 24.79 29.41 29.34 33.01 52.05 167.41 103.07 17.35 20.66
11.30* 11.27* 11.48* 11.53* 12.55** 23.09* 57.55** 40.79* 8.15* 9.40*
log per worker gdp (origin) -0.77 -1.03 3.32 3.94 -9.04 -2.4 -2.98 -1.44 7.63 7.45
7.23 7.09 8.02 8.22 5.63 2.07 3.19 1.65 8.71 8.73
log distance -41.01 -40.65 -40.66 -37.94 -9.61 -20.63 -10.94 -41.85 -41.84
9.50** 9.08** 9.08** 8.00** 3.21** 6.18** 2.57** 8.41** 8.41**
land border -28.16 -36.97 -36.95
19.67 23.23 23.28




share of young population (origin) 242.36 248.25 165.76 292.87 521.77 155.71 281.48 283.68
110.23* 112.35* 88.77+ 118.63* 177.22** 60.80* 118.34* 116.99*
per worker gdp (destination)*immig policy change 7.56 17.17
2.04** 5.84**
per worker gdp (origin)*immig policy change -3.37 -3.2
1.37* 1.44*
log distance*immig policy change -10.2 -10.18
2.50** 2.48**
share of young population (origin)*immig policy change 144.47 149.85
48.43** 48.47**
immig policy change -106.51
69.14
number of observations 8010 8010 8010 8010 8010 551 606 650 8010 8010
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.85 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.27 0.27
common language equals one if a common language is spoken in both host and origin countries. colony is a dummy variable for pairs of countries ever in a colonial
relationship. share of young population (origin) is the share of the population in the origin country aged 15-29, lagged by one year. immig policy change increases by one if
in that year the host country's immigration policy became less restrictive, decreases by one if it became more restrictive, zero if there was no change.
Emigration rate
Table 1. Determinants of bilateral immigrant flows
OLS estimates. Destination and origin countries' dummy variables are included in specifications (1)-(4) and (9)-(10). Regression (5) includes country-pair fixed effects.
Regressions (6), (7), (8) are for the years 1985, 1990, 1995, respectively, and have no fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by country pairs, are presented under each
estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Constant not shown. See Appendix 2 for data sources.
The emigration rate (immigrant inflow from origin to destination country (multiplied by 100,000), divided by origin country's population) gives the number of incoming
immigrants per 100,000 individuals in the origin country's population. per worker gdp is the level of per worker GDP, PPP-adjusted (constant 1996 international dollars),
lagged by one year. distance is the great-circle distance. Land border  equals one if the destination and origin countries share a land border.
2 R 2 REquation 123456
Dependent variable
log per worker gdp (destination) 38.46 50.43 31.92 2.37 38.22 37.78
17.97* 20.78* 12.15** 16.83 13.31** 12.31**
log per worker gdp (origin) 7.44 6.55 83.12 1.66 5.23 1.68
17.12 17.62 49.38+ 12.09 8.21 7.15
square of log per worker gdp (origin) -4.31
2.81
origin country's relative inequality 77.35 82.41
39.05* 44.32+
square of relative inequality -28.25 -29.44
13.17* 14.51*
unemployment rate (destination) -1.36
0.45**






log distance -36.85 -30.42 -36.37
7.57** 8.26** 7.43**
common language 18.85 19.2 18.93
11.84 11.57+ 11.85
share of young population (origin) 225.31 57.12 239.64
110.81* 87.21 109.92*
constant -512.82 -631.03 -433.39 191.73 -159.84 -0.59
181.56** 223.47** 271.59 136.56 131.71 0.24*
number of observations 4028 3350 8010 5010 8010 6429
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.23 0.24
In regression (2), I only include observations characterized by a positive difference between the per capita GDP levels of
destination and origin countries in any given year. In equation (6), I include as regressors the emigration rate lagged by one, two,
three and four years (the coefficients on the latter three lags are not shown). The reason is that, only by introducing all these lags,
I don't reject the null of zero autocovariance in residuals of order 2 (which is one of the requirements of the Arellano and Bond
estimator). Column (6): Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: H0: no autocorrelation z = -
55.05 Pr > z = 0.0000. Column (6): Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0: H0: no
autocorrelation   z =  -0.35   Pr > z = 0.7269. See Appendix 2 for data sources.
Table 2. Panel data regressions: Economic determinants more in detail
Emigration rate
OLS estimates, except for in regression (6) (see below). Destination and origin countries' dummy variables are included in each
specification (except in regression (6)). Standard errors, clustered by country pairs, are presented under each estimated
coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. See the end of Table 1 for definitions of the main
variables used.
multilateral pull gives, for each destination/origin country pair, the average of (log per worker gdp (destination)-log distance)
over all the other destination countries. origin country's relative inequality gives a measure of the inequality in the origin
country relative to the destination country (it equals the gini coefficient in the origin country divided by the gini coefficient in the
destination country).
The emigration rate (immigrant inflow from origin to destination country (multiplied by 100,000), divided by origin country's
population) gives the number of incoming immigrants per 100,000 individuals in the origin country's population.





OLS OLS OLS TOBIT
Dependent variable
log per worker gdp (destination) 40.91 37.41 52.96 162.98 86.43
15.49** 11.06** 19.33** 51.88** 36.14*
log per worker gdp (origin) -22.83 6.12 -17.78 -75.07 -8.62
20.25 10.21 13.13 23.52** 23.03
log distance -31.23 -36.6 -29.45 -38.71 -142.64
7.05** 7.60** 8.19** 12.23** 4.41**
common language 7.35 19.69 15.15 7.06 120.2
8.39 12.93 11.45 12.61 9.18**
share of young population (origin) 65.14 217.99 -13.57 137.17 683.44
99.75 114.24+ 113.13 265.43 299.65*
log yrs schooling (destination) -47.23 -32.23
15.04** 17.75+
log yrs schooling (origin) 7.71 47.93
12.39 36.51
log capital per worker (destination) -27.91
12.58*
log capital per worker (origin) 10.83
13.63
constant -0.61 -90.28 48.56 -862.22 62.86
242.82 126.48 93.73 479.60+ 406.78
number of obs 7411 7313 4103 1933 8010
R-squared 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.69
distance is the great-circle distance. common language is a dummyvariable equal to one if a common language is spoken in both destination and origin
countries. share of young population (origin) is the share of the population in the origin country aged 15-29. log yrs schooling is the log of the average
schooling years in the total population over age 15, lagged by one year. log capital per worker is non-residential capital stock per worker (1985 intl.
prices), lagged by one year. See Appendix 2 for data sources.
Emigration rate
Table 3. Panel data regressions: Robustness Checks
Destination and origin countries' dummy variables are included in each specification. Standard errors, clustered by country pairs, are presented under
each estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The emigration rate (immigrant inflow from origin to destination country (multiplied by 100,000), divided by origin country's population) gives the
number of incoming immigrants per 100,000 individuals in the origin country's population. In regression (1), I use terms of trade (lagged by one year)
as an instrument for per worker GDP (lagged by one year) in both destination and origin country. The F value for the excluded instruments (terms of
trade) is equal to 30.47 and 70.36 in the first stage of per worker GDP of destination and origin countries, respectively. 
per worker gdp is the level of per worker GDP, PPP-adjusted (constant 1996 international dollars), lagged by one year.
2 R 2 Rcountry of origin inflow country of origin inflow country of origin inflow country of origin inflow
UK 17095 France 6072 Hong Kong 19334 Somalia 1264
New Zealand 11045 Netherlands 6014 India 10437 UK 1068
Vietnam 8048 USA 2930 Philippines 9441 Turkey 1042
Hong Kong 5739 Germany 2916 UK 9034 Germany 805
Philippines 5379 UK 2899 Vietnam 8791 Iraq 789
Malaysia 3493 Morocco 2801 Poland 7550 Norway 699
India 3069 Italy 2495 USA 7459 Sweden 612
China 2934 Turkey 2239 China 6292 USA 606
Former Yugoslavia 2790 Zaire 1966 Lebanon 3917 Iran 570
South Africa 2441 Portugal 1435 Sri Lanka 3791 Vietnam 549
Sri Lanka 2146 Japan 833 Portugal 3653 Former Yugoslavia 481
Lebanon 2089 Spain 833 Jamaica 3543 Iceland 479
USA 1724 Former Yugoslavia 829 Chinese Taipei 3255 Poland 448
Fiji 1682 Greece 759 Guyana 3108 Thailand 366
Poland 1608 Poland 655 El Salvador 2697 Pakistan 356
Ireland 1462 China 589 Haiti 2243 Lebanon 335
Chinese Taipei 1358 Algeria 382 Iran 2193 Netherlands 304
Germany 1303 Tunisia 310 France 2070 France 269
Former USSR 1021 Former Yugoslavia 1933 Morocco 215
Portugal 767 percentage change 13.46% South Korea 1584 Italy 200
(1980-1995) Trinidad Tobago 1433 Finland 181
percentage change -6.22% Romania 1241
(1983-1995) Pakistan 1037 percentage change 75.28%




Appendix 1. Average yearly inflows into each destination country, by country of origin (1980-1995)
Australia (1983-1995) Belgium (1984-1995) Canada (1980-1995) Denmark (1990-1994)
percentage change is the percentage change of total immigrant inflows between 1980 and 1995 (for some destination countries, the percentage change is over a shorter
period of time, as indicated). To calculate these percentage changes, I use directly aggregate data on total immigrant inflows. That is why the coverage of years differs
from the summary statistics by country of origin.
The average yearly inflow into each destination country, by origin country, is calculated using only non-zero flow observations. Therefore, for some origin countries,
the average of immigration inflows into the destination country is not taken over the years indicated at the top of each table, but over a shorter period of time.country of origin inflow country of origin inflow country of origin inflow country of origin inflow
Morocco 11892 Poland 117019 China 35425 Portugal 2170
Algeria 9187 Former Yugoslavia 92124 USA 35367 France 1272
Turkey 5777 Bosnia-Herzegovina 76836 Philippines 35121 Belgium 897
Tunisia 3083 Turkey 68791 South Korea 21052 Germany 662
Lebanon 2818 Romania 61910 Chinese Taipei 10882 Italy 441
USA 2403 Italy 39184 UK 9614 Netherlands 281
Haiti 2183 Croatia 24056 Brazil 6779 USA 256
Portugal 2050 Former USSR 23365 Hong Kong 6296 Spain 124
Vietnam 1761 Hungary 21835 Thailand 5913
Zaire 1437 Greece 20372 Germany 5334 percentage change 29.73%
Poland 1422 Bulgaria 19245 Canada 3449 (1980-1995)
Japan 1219 USA 17670 Peru 1008
China 1084 Former CSFR 10692
Former Yugoslavia 1084 Portugal 9654 percentage change -42.10%
Sri Lanka 899 Spain 4705 (1980-1995)
Romania 891 Morocco 4375
Cambodia 860 Slovenia 2658
Spain 400 Tunisia 2249
percentage change -6.23% percentage change 24.85%
(1980-1995) (1980-1995)
Appendix 1. Average yearly inflows into each destination country, by country of origin (1980-1995) (cont.)
France (1984-1995) Germany* (1984-1995) Japan (1980-1995) Luxembourg (1983-1995)
percentage change is the percentage change of total immigrant inflows between 1980 and 1995 (for some destination countries, the percentage change is over a shorter
period of time, as indicated). To calculate these percentage changes, I use directly aggregate data on total immigrant inflows. That is why the coverage of years differs
from the summary statistics by country of origin.
* Figures for migrants from the former Yugoslavia to Germany do not include Croatia from 1992 and Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1993. Data from the former USSR to
Germany does not include Russia from 1992.
The average yearly inflow into each destination country, by origin country, is calculated using only non-zero flow observations. Therefore, for some origin countries, the
average of immigration inflows into the destination country is not taken over the years indicated at the top of each table, but over a shorter period of time.country of origin inflow country of origin inflow country of origin inflow country of origin inflow
Turkey 8363 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3728 Bosnia-Herzegovina 16972 Former Yugoslavia 18716
Former Yugoslavia 7392 Denmark 2201 Iran 4048 Portugal 9085
Morocco 6537 Sweden 1526 Finland 3880 Germany 8333
Germany 5295 UK 1253 Norway 3118 Italy 8216
UK 4575 USA 987 Former Yugoslavia 2840 France 4655
Suriname 4416 Former Yugoslavia 868 Iraq 2051 Spain 4402
USA 2303 Pakistan 682 Denmark 1877 Turkey 4195
Belgium 2050 Iran 669 Somalia 1724 USA 2530
France 1517 Vietnam 612 Chile 1631 UK 2407
Poland 1148 Chile 537 Poland 1484 Austria 1728
Italy 893 Somalia 468 Turkey 1214 Netherlands 1607
Sri Lanka 450 Ethiopia 947 Canada 687
percentage change -16.04% Germany 399 Russian Federation 910
(1980-1995) Lebanon 896 percentage change 24.68%










Appendix 1. Average yearly inflows into each destination country, by country of origin (1980-1995) (cont.)
Switzerland (1984-1995) Netherlands (1984-1995) Norway* (1984-1995) Sweden (1984-1995)
percentage change is the percentage change of total immigrant inflows between 1980 and 1995 (for some destination countries, the percentage change is over a
shorter period of time, as indicated). To calculate these percentage changes, I use directly aggregate data on total immigrant inflows. That is why the coverage
of years differs from the summary statistics by country of origin.
The average yearly inflow into each destination country, by origin country, is calculated using only non-zero flow observations. Therefore, for some origin
countries, the average of immigration inflows into the destination country is not taken over the years indicated at the top of each table, but over a shorter period
of time.
* Figures for migrants from the former Yugoslavia to Norway do not include Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1993.country of origin inflow country of origin inflow
Pakistan 5817 Mexico 199862
India 5047 Philippines 51886
Bangladesh 3796 Vietnam 45041
USA 3776 China 32824
Australia 2659 Dominican Republic 30471
New Zealand 1964 India 29754
Nigeria 1556 South Korea 29197
Iran 1501 Former USSR 23231
Japan 1474 El Salvador 21901
Hong Kong 1287 Jamaica 20219
Ghana 1093 Cuba 15174
Canada 1035 Haiti 15168
Sri Lanka 1021 UK 14939
Philippines 986 Iran 14596
South Africa 926 Poland 13534
Turkey 822 Canada 12980
Jamaica 775 Chinese Taipei 12962
Malaysia 701 Colombia 12696
Iraq 500 Laos 12165
Kenya 481 Ireland 12054
Poland 481 Guatemala 9328
Thailand 444 Guyana 9243
Germany 419 Cambodia 8108
Cyprus 402 Pakistan 7725
Morocco 380 Peru 7637
Spain 363 Germany 7005
Sweden 355 Hong Kong 6994
France 345 Thailand 6270
Italy 340 Ecuador 6189
Netherlands 289 Nicaragua 5626
Former Yugoslavia 276 Honduras 5507
Portugal 223 Bangladesh 2684
percentage change -20.49% percentage change 35.79%
(1980-1995) (1980-1995)
percentage change is the percentage change of total immigrant inflows between 1980 and 1995 (for some destination
countries, the percentage change is over a shorter period of time, as indicated). To calculate these percentage changes, I
use directly aggregate data on total immigrant inflows. That is why the coverage of years differs from the summary
statistics by country of origin.
Appendix 1. Average yearly inflows into each destination country, by country of origin (1980-1995) (cont.)
United Kingdom (1982-1995) United States (1980-1995)
The average yearly inflow into each destination country, by origin country, is calculated using only non-zero flow
observations. Therefore, for some origin countries, the average of immigration inflows into the destination country is not
taken over the years indicated at the top of each table, but over a shorter period of time.Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
emigration rate 8010 13.2433 81.5410 0.0000 1568.9430
per worker gdp (destination) 8010 40682 5895 25252 55361
per worker gdp (origin) 8010 20061 14106 1027 55361
log distance 8010 8.1715 0.8694 5.0872 9.3836
land border 8010 0.0268 0.1616 0 1
common language 8010 0.1704 0.3760 0 1
colony 8010 0.0385 0.1923 0 1
share of young population (origin) 8010 0.2612 0.0303 0.1951 0.3152
years schooling (destination) 4103 9.6403 1.3096 6.8370 11.8650
years schooling (origin) 4103 7.0285 2.4659 2.7240 11.8650
capital per worker (destination) 4103 36041 12167 16992 76733
capital per worker (origin) 4103 19232 13290 822 48135
unemployment rate (destination) 5010 6.7306 3.4646 0.5000 14.1000
unemployment rate (origin) 5010 8.1476 5.2840 0.0800 27.6000
origin country's relative inequality 4028 1.2123 0.3846 0.3861 2.6810
The share of young population (origin) is based on data from the United Nations. The unemployment rate is from the World Development Indicators
(2001), World Bank. The origin country's relative inequality is based on data on Gini coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996) data set (only high-
quality observations were used). Data on terms of trade comes from the World Bank's Global Development Network Growth Database, Macro Time
Series (2002). The data set on immigration policy changes was constructed by Anna Maria Mayda and Krishna Patel (2004) - see Appendix to the paper.
All time-varying variables (except the emigration rate) are lagged by one year.
The emigration rate (immigrant inflow from origin to destination country (multiplied by 100,000), divided by origin country's population) is from the
IMS data set (OECD 1997). Per worker GDP, PPP-adjusted (constant 1996 international dollars) is from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1. Log 
distance, land border, common language , and colony (countries ever in a colonial relationship) are from Glick and Rose (2001). Years of schooling
are from Barro and Lee (2000) data set. Capital per worker (Nonresidential Capital Stock per Worker, 1985 intl. prices) is from the Penn World Tables,
version 5.6.
Appendix 2. Summary Statistics (1980-1995) and Data Sources
Summary statistics for the emigration rate, per worker gdp (destination), per worker gdp (origin), log distance, land border, common language , 
colony, share of young population (origin) are based on the same observations as in the pooled regressions in Table 1. Summary statistics for years 
schooling (destination), years of schooling (origin), capital per worker (destination), capital per worker (origin) are based on the same observations as
in regression (3), Table 3. Summary statistics for unemployment rate (destination) and unemployment rate (origin) are based on the same observations























































































































































80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96
Australia Belgium Canada Denmark
France Germany Japan Luxembourg
Netherlands Norway Sweden Switzerland
























Graphs by country of destination
Figure 1: Total immigrant inflow by destination country
 Figure 2: The actual emigration rate as a function of mean income opportunities 
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